of ISA in July 2019. In principle, the draft exploitation regulations should be finalised by 2020.
The current draft regulations contain sections on: form of applications; fee for applications; processing of applications; consideration of applications by the Commission and Council; exploitation contracts; plan of work for exploitation; annual fees; royalties; returns, payments and refunds; record, inspection and audit; anti-avoidance measures; interests and penalties; suspension or termination of contract; disputes and review of payments; information gathering and handling; inspections; enforcement and penalties; dispute settlement; and review of the Authority's regulations. The draft regulations however do not construct a model for liability and compensation for damage as a result of these activities.
The current chapter is a contribution to the discussion on how to compensate damage caused by activities in the Area. The chapter sketches the current parallel system of the sponsoring State's responsibility for damage caused in the Area and the sponsored contractor's liability for damage caused in the Area (Section 2). The chapter attempts to draw a model for an improved liability and compensation system for damage caused by deep-sea mining in the Area (Section 3). The chapter ends with some concluding remarks (Section 4).
2
The Current 'System' of Responsibility and Liability for Pollution Damage Caused in the Area 2.1 Prelude To ensure compensation of environmental damage, UNCLOS places responsibility on the sponsoring State of the company applying for exploration and exploitation in the Area to ensure compliance with the applicable parts of UNCLOS, a breach of which places liability on the supporting State.14 The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) gave an Advisory Opinion 1 February 2011 on the Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area15 based on Nauru's submission of an application for approval of a work plan for exploratory seabed mining activities to the ISA, 'but had become concerned that the potential liabilities or costs arising from its sponsorship of a mining entity might exceed its financial capacities as a developing country.'16
2.2
Sponsorship The notion of sponsorship is a key element in the exploration and exploitation system of resources in the Area.17 Enterprises and, in association with the Authority, States Parties, or state enterprises or natural or juridical persons can engage in activities in the Area.18 Natural and juridical persons must however satisfy two requirements to be eligible to engage in activities in the Area: 1) 'they must be either nationals of a State Party or effectively controlled by it or its nationals' ,19 and 2) 'they must be "sponsored by such States".'20 The requirement of sponsorship similarly identically applies to state enterprises.21 States Parties themselves engaged in deep seabed mining are directly bound by the obligations set forth in UNCLOS and does not need sponsorship.22
The sponsorship requirement is crucial, creating the necessary nexus between the international legal treaty only binding on the States Parties and the domestic legal systems, of which the Enterprises are subjects.23 The nexus between States Parties and subjects of domestic law consists of the nationality and effective control, which requires all contractors and applicants for contracts to ' 
2.3
Liability in General In its advisory opinion, the Tribunal sets forth the system and different sources of liability as stated in UNCLOS: 1) rules concerning the liability of State Parties (article 139, paragraph 2, first sentence),26 2) rules concerning sponsoring State liability (article 139, paragraph 2, second sentence),27 and 3) rules concerning the liability of the contractor and the Authority (referred to in Annex III, article 22). Paragraph 2 of article 139 attach liability on a sponsoring State from its failure to carry out its own responsibilities, while not being liable for the failure of the sponsored contractor to meet its obligations. 'There is, however, a link between the liability of the sponsoring State and the failure of the sponsored contractor to comply with its obligations, thereby causing damage.'28 This chapter discusses these rules more in-depth and towards the end offers some suggestions on improvements.
State Fault-Based Responsibility for Failure to Properly Perform Due Diligence -Secondary Fault-Based Liability
The State(s) sponsoring contractors or applicants for contracts for the exploration and exploitation of resources in the Area have responsibilities and obligations under the UNCLOS. These obligations are characterised as 'direct obligations' .29 The main direct obligations incumbent on the sponsoring States are: the obligation to assist the Authority in the exercise of control over activities in the Area; the obligation to apply a precautionary approach; the obligation to apply best environmental practices; the obligation to take measures to ensure the provision of guarantees in the event of an emergency order by the Authority for protection of the marine environment; the obligation to ensure the availability of recourse for compensation in respect of damage caused by pollution; and the obligation to conduct environmental impact assessments.30
The sponsoring State's liability for failure to meet its direct obligations is governed exclusively by the first sentence of paragraph 2 of article 139, while a sponsoring State's liability for a failure to meet its obligations in relation to damage caused by a sponsored contractor is covered by both the first and second sentences of article 139.31 The nature of these obligations obviously does define and determine the scope of liability.
In its advisory opinion ITLOS relied on UNCLOS article 139 paragraph 1,32 article 153 paragraph 4,33 and Annex III article 4 paragraph 4,34 when confirming that 'the obligation (responsibility) of the sponsoring State is "to ensure" that the "activities in the Area" conducted by the sponsored contractor are "in conformity" or in "compliance" with the rules to which they refer.'35 The Tribunal highlighted that one of the sponsoring State's obligations under international law expressed as a 'responsibility to ensure' in UNCLOS establishes a mechanism where UNCLOS rules concerning activities in the Area become the responsibility to ensure, within their legal systems, that a contractor so sponsored shall carry out activities in the Area in conformity with the terms of its contract and its obligations under this Convention. A sponsoring State shall not, however, be liable for damage caused by any failure of a contractor sponsored by it to comply with its obligations if that State Party has adopted laws and regulations and taken administrative measures which are, within the framework of its legal system, reasonably appropriate for securing compliance by persons under its jurisdiction.' 35 ITLOS, Advisory Opinion of 1 February 2011, supra note 15 at p. 40. effective for sponsored contractors, which are bound by domestic law and not UNCLOS per se. 36 A violation by the sponsoring state of this obligation 'to ensure' entails liability for the actual amount of damage.37 The sponsoring State remains liable for damage also after the completion of the exploration phase.38 Paragraph 2 of article 139 requires two conditions for liability to arise: 1) the failure of the sponsoring State to carry out its responsibilities and 2) the occurrence of damage.39 Such failure may be 'act or an omission that is contrary to that State's responsibilities under the deep seabed mining regime.'40 That said, a sponsoring State is only liable for a failure to carry out its responsibilities when damage has been inflicted. Thus, no matter the situation, no damage equals no liability for the sponsoring State.41 Therefore, 'in order for the sponsoring State's liability to arise, there must be a causal link between the failure of that State and the damage caused by the sponsored contractor.'42 This causal link cannot be presumed and must be proven.43 Strict liability is therefore not the standard of liability for a sponsoring state.44 'However, not every violation of an obligation by a sponsored contractor automatically gives rise to the liability of the sponsoring State. Such liability is limited to the State's failure to meet its obligation to "ensure" compliance by the sponsored contractor.'45 As such, a private entity's failure does not trigger liability for the sponsoring State, but is a mere trigger mechanism for 36 Id at p. 41. 37 UNCLOS Art. 139, paragraph 2, first sentence and ITLOS, potentially giving rise to liability. Only the sponsoring State's own failure to carry out its own responsibilities give rise to liability for the sponsoring State. 46 The Tribunal importantly pointed out that:
The sponsoring State's obligation "to ensure" is not an obligation to achieve, in each and every case, the result that the sponsored contractor complies with the aforementioned obligations. Rather, it is an obligation to deploy adequate means, to exercise best possible efforts, to do the utmost, to obtain this result. To utilize the terminology current in international law, this obligation may be characterized as an obligation "of conduct" and not "of result", and as an obligation of "due diligence".47
In explaining the obligation to act with due diligence, the Tribunal quoted the International Court of Justice in Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay):
It is an obligation which entails not only the adoption of appropriate rules and measures, but also a certain level of vigilance in their enforcement and the exercise of administrative control applicable to public and private operators, such as the monitoring of activities undertaken by such operators …48
The International Law Commission expressed the same view.49 Thus, the Tribunal confirmed that sponsoring States are only liable for a failure to not properly perform their due diligence. The content of this due diligence obligation is not precise partly due to diligence as 'a variable concept' .50 Sufficiently diligent measures can be insufficient with time as a result of for example 'new scientific or technological knowledge' .51 The level of due diligence also increases according to the level of risk. The Tribunal stated that 'the standard of due diligence has to be more severe for the riskier activities. ' State must adopt within its legal system 'reasonably appropriate' measures to comply with the standard of due diligence appropriate to the level of risk, for which the measures are adopted.53 Compliance with the above-listed direct obligations 'can also be seen as a relevant factor in meeting the due diligence "obligation to ensure" and that the said obligations are in most cases couched as obligations to ensure compliance with a specific rule.'54 Sponsoring States also have another direct obligation, which 'gives substance to the sponsoring State's obligation to adopt laws and regulations within the framework of its legal system.'55 Article 235, paragraph 2, states as follows:
States shall ensure that recourse is available in accordance with their legal systems for prompt and adequate compensation or other relief in respect of damage caused by pollution of the marine environment by natural or juridical persons under their jurisdiction.
Article 235, paragraph 2, applies to sponsoring States as 'the State with jurisdiction over the persons that caused the damage.'56 The Tribunal also points out that States may also need to 'establish substantive rules governing claims for damages before its domestic courts … ensuring that the sponsored contractor meets its obligation under Annex III, article 22, of the Convention to provide reparation for damages caused by wrongful acts committed in the course of its activities in the Area.'57 Additionally, the sponsoring State's laws, regulations, and administrative measures must be in force during the whole period of the contract between ISA and the contractor.58 The existence of such laws, regulations, and administrative measures are not a condition precedent for concluding a contract with ISA, but 'it is a necessary requirement for compliance with the obligation of due diligence of the sponsoring State and for its exemption from liability. ' Examples of domestic law rules are provisions concerning 'financial viability and technical capacity of sponsored contractors, conditions for issuing a certificate of sponsorship and penalties for non-compliance by such contractors' ,62 and enforcement mechanisms of ITLOS decisions. Example of administrative measures are 'the establishment of enforcement mechanisms for active supervision of the activities of the sponsored contractor' ,63 and to coordinate better efficiency between the sponsored contractor and ISA to remove activities leading to duplicate work.64
If the sponsoring State has taken the 'reasonably appropriate' measures and thus complied with its due diligence standard under the UNLOS, the sponsoring State is exempt from liability for damage inflicted by the sponsored contractor.65 This can result in situations, in which a sponsoring State has fulfilled its due diligence standard, while, at the same time, damage has been inflicted in the Area and has not been compensated. The question becomes on whom to place liability for harm inflicted beyond national jurisdiction without any fault by a sponsoring State in exercising its obligation to prevent harm because the standard of care required is met? The Tribunal and the UNCLOS are clear on the fact that liability cannot be placed on the sponsoring State in such a situation.
Simultaneous Contractor Liability for Pollution Damage -National
Legislation UNCLOS requires a contractor that wants to engage in deep seabed mining to first secure and thereafter maintain the sponsorship of a State, as mentioned above. Sponsorship is the mechanism for domestic legal entities to comply with the international legal obligations of UNCLOS only binding on State Parties, and ISA's regulations and instruments applicable to these domestic legal entities.66 As stated in Annex III, article 4, paragraph 4: The sponsoring State or States shall, pursuant to article 139, have the responsibility to ensure, within their legal systems, that a contractor so sponsored shall carry out activities in the Area in conformity with the terms of its contract and its obligations under this Convention. A sponsoring State shall not, however, be liable for damage caused by any failure of a contractor sponsored by it to comply with its obligations if that State Party has adopted laws and regulations and taken administrative measures which are, within the framework of its legal system, reasonably appropriate for securing compliance by persons under its jurisdiction.
A sponsoring State is obligated to adopt laws and regulations and to take the administrative measures necessary, as the contractor's obligations cannot all be enforced through administrative measures and contractual arrangements.67 This is partly because contractual obligations cannot be invoked by other entities, than the parties to the contract, against the sponsoring State, and that contracts generally lacks transparency as it is difficult for the public to measure the sponsoring State's success in meeting its requirements.68 Annex III of UNCLOS and ISA regulations do not require a sponsorship agreement between the contractor and the sponsoring State, nor its submission to ISA or public publication if in existence.69 The sponsoring State is only required to submit a certificate of sponsorship to ISA stating its assumption responsibility according to article 139, article 153, paragraph 4, and Annex III, article 4, paragraph 4, of UNCLOS. 70 That said, the sponsored contractor is obviously obligated to conduct its activities in the Area according to the terms of the contract. Even though 29 contracts have been entered into, ISA's Legal and Technical Commission are now developing standard contractual terms 'on exploitation for Mineral Resources in the Area for consideration by the Members of the Authority and all stakeholders.'71 If a sponsored contractor fails to comply with rules in UNCLOS, in the ISA seabed-mining regime, or in the contract, which results in damage the sponsoring State is not liable.72 UNCLOS Annex III, article 22, places liability on the contractor for inflicted damage in the Area for its activities:
The contractor shall have responsibility or liability for any damage arising out of wrongful acts in the conduct of its operations, account being taken of contributory acts or omissions by the Authority. Similarly, the Authority shall have responsibility or liability for any damage arising out of wrongful acts in the exercise of its powers and functions, including violations under article 168, paragraph 2, account being taken of contributory acts or omissions by the contractor. Liability in every case shall be for the actual amount of damage.
The contractor also remains liable for damage after the completion of the exploration phase.73 The contractor and the ISA are mainly liable for wrongful acts conducted performing contractor's activities and ISA's powers and fictions respectfully, and not the sponsoring State.74 As previously mentioned the sponsoring State is liable for its own failure to carry out its responsibilities, while the contractor is liable for its own non-compliance. 75 As previously mentioned, the sponsoring State has direct obligations to ensure and adopt appropriate rules and measures, and also enforce these rules and measures at a certain level of vigilance.76 One of these direct obligations require the implementation of rules and measures for prompt and adequate compensation or other relief in respect of damage caused by pollution of the marine environment.
2.5.1
So What Rules and Measures Have Been Implemented by Sponsoring States? In 2014, Tonga 'became the first country in the world to put in place a law that manages seabed mineral activities within its national marine space and under its sponsorship in international waters.'77 Whether this is in fact correct (1) The Sponsored Party shall be responsible for the performance of all Seabed Mineral Activities carried out within the Contract Area, and their compliance with the Rules of the ISA; and will be liable for the actual amount of any compensation or damage or penalties arising out of its failure so to comply, or out of any wrongful acts or omissions and those of its employees, officers, subcontractors, and agents in the conduct of the Seabed Mineral Activities.
(2) Any obligations which are to be observed and performed by the Sponsored Party shall at any time at which the Sponsored Party is more than one person be joint and several obligations.
(3) A Sponsored Party shall at all times keep the Kingdom indemnified against all actions, proceedings, costs, charges, claims and demands which may be made or brought by any third party in relation to its Seabed Mineral Activities.
Other Pacific Island countries, such as Tuvalu, have implemented the same wording the same year.81 Nauru made some smaller amendments to the same text,82 following the wording of Fiji's 2013 enactment.83 ISA has also made a list of countries' legislation/reciprocating legislation and national initiatives with respect to the activities in the Area.84 Singapore's deep sea mining legislation for the Area is less specific:
(1) Where a licensee is responsible or liable for any wrongful act under Annex III, Article 22 of the Convention, the Court may -(a) order the licensee to pay to a person such compensation for the wrongful act as may be ordered to be paid to that person pursuant to that Article; and (b) grant to a person such other remedy for the licensee's wrongful act as may be granted to that person pursuant to that Article.
(2) In this section, "licensee" includes a Singapore company which has ceased to hold a licence.85
It is apparent from a brief look at some national legislation that sponsored parties are under fault-based liability. One problem with fault-based liability enacted on national level is the more obvious fact that the level of fault that is required to trigger liability will be different between sponsored parties sponsored by different countries, as fault is defined differently among countries. Similarly, rules of evidence various between countries too, which will impact the "hurdle" of attaching fault-based liability to a sponsored party. As these enactments show, some countries have also included an indemnity clause. Taking into account the abovementioned State's responsibility for due diligence, which lack of government oversight contributing to damage attach 82 International Seabed Minerals Act 2015 (Nauru), s. 29: '(1) A Sponsored Party shall be responsible for the performance of all Seabed Mineral Activities carried out within the Contract Area, and their compliance with the Rules of the ISA and shall be liable for the actual amount of any compensation, damage or penalties arising out of its failure so to comply, or out of any wrongful acts or omissions in the conduct of the Seabed Mineral Activities. liability, and situations where a State is part of a joint venture engaged in deep seabed mining, these indemnity clauses appear unenforceable in certain situations.
2.5.2
Compensable Damage UNCLOS does specify that the amount of damages should be for 'the actual amount of damages' .86 This terminology 'actual amount of damages' is repeated word for word in ISA regulation Standard Clauses for exploration contracts87 and abovementioned national law regulating activities in the Area. The Tribunal confirmed that the form of reparation depends on actual damages and the technical feasibility of restoring the pollution damage to ex ante,88 relying on article 34 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility when determining the form of reparation, which states:
Full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.89
Neither UNCLOS nor the Regulations define or specify compensable damage, or which subjects are entitled to damages.90 However, the Tribunal lists a couple of possible types of damage: damage to the Area, damage to the Area's resources considered the common heritage of mankind, and damage to the marine environment. 91 The lack of further clarity on what damage categories are compensable and how to actually calculate this 'actual amount of damages' , place a large responsibility on the sponsoring States and national legislation to properly do this. It also opens up for forum shopping by contractors when choosing from with jurisdiction to conduct activities in the Area. A sense of such bias by the contractor could presumably initiate sponsoring States facilitating for more lenient national liability and compensation legislation as well as environmental legislation to attract the financial benefits of sponsoring a contractor.
3
The Sponsored Contractor's Strict Liability for Pollution Damage in the Area ITLOS states that the sponsoring States may apply more stringent standards as far as the protection of the marine environment is concerned to their contractors.98 Sponsoring States should implement strict liability for their contractors for pollution damage from activities in the Area, as such activities are hazardous, to ensure prompt and adequate compensation.99 There is no good reason why injured parties and the environment should take the risk of contractors adhering to a negligence standard for pollution damage in the Area. The cost of such liability can be internalised and offset to some extent by insurance. 100 The Norwegian Petroleum Act101 is a good example of how strict liability on the licensee for pollution damage caused by petroleum does not limit the interest from national and international companies to explore and produce oil and gas on the Norwegian Continental Shelf.
3.2.2
Pollution Damage Fund under the ISA ITLOS suggested that ISA should consider the option of setting up a damage fund as a means to cover damages that are not otherwise covered by the deep seabed mining liability scheme, the liability gap.102 A pollution damage fund would be a good way of creating a second layer of safety to ensure compensation of pollution damage in the Area, for situations where the sponsored contractor become delinquent and claims are beyond the scope of its insurance.103 Such a fund should be under the ISA, as the international regulatory body and collector of certain deep seabed related fees. ISA has created draft regulation to establish a Environmental Liability Trust Fund.104
3.2.3
Residual Liability for the Sponsoring State The sponsoring State is not residually liable for a contractor's non-compliance. 105 However, sponsoring States should be liable in last instance as deep seabed mining is a significant hazardous activity.106 The sponsoring States set the financial requirements of the contractor and can increase financial security requirements of the contractor to decrease its own risk. The environment in the Area, the common heritage of human kind, should not be put at risk and suffer when this could be avoided.
Conclusion
The sponsoring State's liability arises from its own failure to carry out its responsibilities, whereas the sponsored contractor's liability arises from its own non-compliance. These two forms of liability exist simultaneously and in parallel. The only connection between the two is that the sponsoring State's liability depends upon the sponsored contractor's damage resulting from activities or omissions.107 This system facilitates for liability gaps, which could and should be removed by enacting on a national level strict liability for pollution damage in the Area on the sponsored contractor, an international seabed pollution damage fund, and residual liability on sponsoring States. This is stricter than the current international legal situation, but international law is constantly evolving and should evolve accordingly.
